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Abstract: John MacFarlane argues against objectivism about “tasty”/”not tasty” in the 
following way. If objectivism were true then, given that speakers use “tasty”/”not tasty” in 
accordance with a rule, TP, speakers would be using an evidently unreliable method to 
form judgements and make claims about what is tasty. Since this is implausible, 
objectivism must be false. In this paper, I describe a context in which speakers deviate 
from TP. I argue that MacFarlane's argument against objectivism fails when applied to 
uses of “not tasty” within this context. So objectivism about “not tasty” is still a viable 
position within this context.
Keywords: MacFarlane, predicates of personal taste, relativism, objectivism, sociology
1 MacFarlane's TP
Although he acknowledges  some exceptions  (which we'll  turn to  shortly),  MacFarlane
(2014, p. 4)  claims that we employ the following method to decide when to call things
“tasty”/”not tasty”:
TP
If you know first-hand how something tastes, call it “tasty” just in case its flavour is 
pleasing to you, and “not tasty” just in case its flavour is not pleasing to you.
Though TP takes the form of a prescription, because it is intended as a description of our
method for using “tasty”/”not tasty,” it should be understood as a descriptive proposal. 1
According to MacFarlane (2014, p. 141), TP delineates under what conditions we take the
use of “tasty“/”not tasty” to be  warranted.  MacFarlane (ibid,  p. 21, p. 141) takes TP—so
understood—to be a datum that any satisfactory theory of the meaning of “tasty”/”not
tasty” must respect.
It  is  on this basis that MacFarlane (ibid,  pp. 2-7) justifies rejection of objectivism about
“tasty”/”not tasty.” MacFarlane defines objectivism as the conjunction of (a) and (b):
1 In this paper when I speak of “tasty”/”not tasty,” I am referring to both positive and negative forms of the
predicate. When I speak of “tasty” I am referring to only the positive form of the predicate. When I speak
of “not tasty” I am referring to only the negative form of the predicate. Although talk of “tasty”/”not
tasty” may be cumbersome, it helps me to be unambiguous about which forms of the predicate I intend to
speak of at different parts of this paper.
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Objectivism
(a) “tasty” is true of some things, false of others, and
(b) whether “tasty” is true or false of a thing, on a particular occasion of use, does 
not depend on the idiosyncratic tastes of the speaker, assessor, or anyone else.
As MacFarlane (ibid, pp. 2-3) intends the thesis, contextual variation in the extension of
“tasty”/”not  tasty”  is  consistent  with  objectivism.  He  allows,  for  example,  that  the
extension  of  “tasty”/”not  tasty”  shifts  in  the  same  way  that  the  extensions  of  other
gradable  adjectives  (e.g.  “red”,  “tall”,  “flat”  etc.)  shift  with  context.  What  objectivism
disallows is variation in extension with the 'idiosyncratic tastes of the speaker, assessor, or
anyone else.' According to objectivism, just as the fact that A ('or anyone else') has a visual
experience of redness when looking at an object doesn't make A's claim that the object is
red true, so too, the fact that A ('or anyone else') has a pleasing gustatory experience when
eating a particular food doesn't make A's claim that the food is tasty true.
MacFarlane rejects objectivism because he thinks it has an implausible implication when it
is  combined  with  two  further  assumptions.  These  are:  firstly,  that  there  is  a  lot  of
divergence  across  speakers  in  what  foods  they  find  pleasing;  and  secondly,  that  TP
accurately describes the conditions under which we think the application of “tasty”/”not
tasty” to a food is warranted. Given these two assumptions, speakers will make different
judgements and claims about the tastiness of the same food. But given objectivism, a large
number  of  such  speakers  must  be  making a  mistake.  Therefore  using what  one  finds
pleasing and displeasing as a way of reaching a verdict on whether some food is tasty
must be a highly unreliable way of making a true judgement or claim about whether some
food is tasty. MacFarlane thinks it implausible that we would use an evidently unreliable
method to make taste judgements and claims and for this reason he rejects objectivism.
MacFarlane acknowledges that there are uses of “tasty”/”not tasty” that diverge from TP.2
Following Lasersohn (2005, p.670), MacFarlane (2014, pp. 155-156) distinguishes between
exo-centric uses of “tasty”/”not tasty” and auto-centric uses of “tasty”/”not tasty.” With
auto-centric uses of “tasty”/”not tasty,” one uses the predicate in accordance with what
one oneself finds pleasing and  not  pleasing. With exo-centric uses one uses “tasty”/”not
tasty” in accordance with what someone else finds pleasing and  not pleasing. Exo-centric
uses of “tasty”/”not tasty” obviously do not conform to TP: they are exceptions to that
rule. A dog-owner who says, “that's tasty,” speaking of dog food, need not be going wrong
in saying this, even though she herself finds the taste of the dog food displeasing or even if
she does not know how dog food tastes: she can speak in accordance with what her dog
finds  pleasing.  However,  MacFarlane's  objection  against  objectivism  is  that  use  of
“tasty”/”not tasty” in accordance with anyone's idiosyncratic gustatory likes and dislikes is
2 Note  that  when  someone  doesn't  use  “tasty”/”not  tasty”  in  accordance  with  what  tastes  she  finds
pleasing and displeasing because she has lost track of how something tastes, this is not an exception to
TP.
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not a reliable way to form true judgements and claims about what is tasty, if objectivism is
true. So, given objectivism, one is just as likely to be unreliable in one's pursuit of truth if
one uses “tasty”/”not tasty” exo-centrically as one is if one uses it auto-centrically. This
point applies just as much to exo-centric uses of “tasty”/”not tasty” that defer to what
pleases or displeases a contextually salient group as it does to exo-centric uses that defer to
a contextually salient individual.
In this paper, I will provide a partial defence of objectivism by identifying a context in
which we consider application of “not tasty” to an item unwarranted even though we
know first-hand how it tastes and that its flavour is displeasing to us, unless what we find
displeasing tracks some feature of the item besides our own displeasure at its taste.3 In this
context,  our  use  of  “not  tasty”  deviates  from  TP  in  a  way  that  makes  trouble  for
MacFarlane's argument against objectivism. I describe this context in section 3. In section
4, I describe a more accurate alternative to TP. In section 5, I show how the alternative can
accommodate MacFarlane's reasons for accepting TP. In section 6, I argue that the more
accurate  alternative  to  TP shows  that  MacFarlane's  argument  against  objectivism fails
when it is applied to the use of “not tasty” in the context described in section 3. I begin in
section 2 by registering MacFarlane's reasons for accepting TP.
2 MacFarlane's defence of TP
MacFarlane  provides  three  reasons  to  believe  that  TP describes  the  conditions  under
which we count application of “tasty”/”not tasty” as warranted. Firstly, MacFarlane takes
this to be self-evident. He asserts:
To a pretty good first approximation, we call a food “tasty” when we find its taste 
pleasing, and “not tasty” when we do not. (MacFarlane, 2014, p.3)
He offers no evidence in support of this assertion. Secondly, MacFarlane (ibid, p.4) claims
that the following sentences seem 'odd':
(1) I’m not sure whether espresso is tasty, but I hate how it tastes.
(2) I’ve never been able to stand the taste of durian. Might it be tasty?
(3) I love orange juice and hate tomato juice. But who knows? Perhaps tomato juice is
tastier.
In each case, there's a dis-connect between whether the speaker likes the taste of an item
3 For an alternative response to MacFarlane's argument against objectivism see (Hirvonen, 2016). Hirvonen
argues that  “tasty”/”not  tasty” is  used in  accordance with objectivism in most  contexts.  But,  against
MacFarlane's assumption to the contrary, she argues that it is not implausible that we are systematically
mistaken in our taste judgements and claims. I will not be defending such an error theory. Rather, I will
be defending an objectivism that is restricted to contexts in which we appear to be making an earnest
attempt to track certain objective properties of food which food plausibly does possess some of the time
and which we plausibly are able to detect some of the time. This restricted objectivism is in no need of an
error theory.
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and whether the speaker applies the predicate “tasty”/”not tasty” to that item. This dis-
connect seems responsible for the oddness of (1)-(3). This suggests that ordinarily there
should be no such dis-connect: you should use “tasty” when something is pleasing to you
and you should use “not tasty” when it is not pleasing to you. 
Thirdly, MacFarlane thinks that our use of “tasty”/”not tasty” has a certain characteristic
purpose. If we did use “tasty”/”not tasty” in such a way that (1)-(3) were not odd then, he
thinks, the predicate would lose this purpose.
We  classify  things  as  tasty  or  not  tasty  in  order  to  help  guide  our  gustatory  
deliberations. We eat things we regard as tasty because we expect them to taste  
good to  us.  Conversely,  we may avoid  eating  things  we don’t  know are  tasty,  
because they might taste bad to us. But these explanations presuppose something 
like TP. (ibid, p.4)
MacFarlane offers no evidence in favour of this third claim about the purposes to which
people tend to put “tasty”/”not tasty.” As with the first, he takes it as self-evident.
The datum underlying MacFarlane's second reason for accepting TP is compatible with the
alternative that  I  am going to  propose:  the alternative doesn't  imply that  (1)-(3)  don't
sound odd. However, I will be disputing MacFarlane's first and third reasons for accepting
TP. I will discuss MacFarlane's reasons for accepting TP again in section 5. 
In  light  of  the  possibility  of  exo-centric  uses,  one  should  already  be  suspicious  of
MacFarlane's first and third reasons for accepting TP.  Simple recognition of  exo-centric
uses of “tasty”/”not tasty” should be enough to cast doubt on the first reason. Examination
of other purposes to which predicates of personal taste can be put—which are listed by
Lasersohn (2005, pp. 671-673)—should be enough to cast doubt on the third reason. But as
has  already  been  mentioned,  exo-centric  uses  nonetheless  do  not  cast  doubt  on
MacFarlane's argument against objectivism. The exception to TP that I describe in the next
section, however, will do so.
3 Negative taste assessments at the dinner table
Let's call an utterance of the sentence “this is not tasty” as used to speak of some food, a
negative taste assessment.  In this section I describe a context in which, even if a speaker
knows first hand how something tastes and that the taste displeases her, we consider a
negative taste assessment unwarranted insofar as the assessment doesn't track a feature of
the food besides its being not liked by the speaker or anyone else.
Around some dinner tables, there is an expectation that you eat the food on your plate,
even if the taste of the food is displeasing to you.4 In her study of Australian family dinner
4 As should be familiar to anyone who remembers discovering, as a child, that not everyone does dinner
time in quite the same way as one's own family does dinner time, different dinner tables foster different
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times,  Greishaber (1997, p.  658) notes that children were subject to the following rules
(amongst others):
 All food is to be eaten.
 Some vegetables are to be eaten for the evening meal.
 A portion of vegetables is to be eaten at the evening meal.
 What is on the plate must be eaten.
 What is requested must be eaten. (also noted by (Ochs, Pontecorvo, & Fasulo, 1996,
p. 17))
These rules are not contingent upon the child's finding the food pleasing. Often these rules
apply as much to adults  as they do to children.  Enforcement of  the rules is  no doubt
different for children as compared with adults. A child may be forced to eat any leftover
food the following day or she may be forced to forfeit dessert if she violates the rules,
whereas an adult probably will not. Despite differences in the means of enforcement, often
the same rule is nonetheless in place for adults: eat what's on your plate, even if you find it
displeasing. If you go to dinner at a friend's house or at your mother's house, and labour
has been spent in financing and cooking the food, then, even if you don't find the food
pleasing,  you  will  feel  an  intense  pressure  to  eat  the  food  because  you  know you're
breaking a rule and you know that you will likely face emotional and social sanctions for
doing so.
Now, if you are in a context where you are under an obligation to eat food even if you find
it  not  pleasing, then you may seek to excuse yourself from eating the food so that you
don't have to do something you find not pleasing. What kinds of excuse are available? You
can excuse yourself from eating the food in the following two ways. Firstly, you can try to
excuse your non-eating by drawing attention to your idiosyncratic food preferences. The
food just  happens not to appeal  to you but this doesn't  reflect  any defect  in the food.
Secondly, you can try to excuse your non-eating by drawing attention to some respect in
which the food or its preparation deviates from how it ought to be or normally is and
where the measure of how it ought to be, or normally is, is not simply a question of how
pleasing the food is to you or anyone else. Here are some examples of such deviancy. A
pastry is soggy and moist but pastries are supposed to be dry. The beer taps in the student
bar haven't been cleaned recently but they should be cleaned regularly. Dad used Aunt
Bessie's gravy but mum usually uses Paxo when she makes the roast. In each case, there is
a way the food or its preparation ought to be or normally is but is not in fact. In each case,
the deviation from a norm is not identifiable with whether anyone finds the food pleasing
or not. Whether dad did use a different brand of gravy from the normal one, whether this
kinds of  context.  For  example,  Ochs et  al.  (1996)  note  that  in  the  Italian  households they observed,
children were actively encouraged to perform and develop their personalities by choosing what to eat
and what not to eat, whereas their American counterparts were chastised for failing to eat anything if
their only reason for doing so was that they just didn't like it. In this paper I focus upon a particular kind
of dinner table context. I do not mean to suggest that all dinner table contexts are like the one we discuss.
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pastry  is soggy while  standard pastries  are  dry,  and whether  the  beer  taps  have been
cleaned  recently  and  should  have  been,  are  states  of  affairs  that  are  what  they  are
regardless of who finds the gravy, pastry or beer tasty. To excuse oneself from consuming
something by drawing attention to some such deviance in the food or drink from some
such norm is to provide a different kind of explanation of one's non-eating than to excuse
oneself by simply drawing attention to whether the food is gustatorily pleasing.
The contrast between the two possible sites of explanation for not eating food is clearly
drawn in the following remark from the Picky Eating Adult Support Group: 
If we go visit relatives or friends we have to tell them ahead of time that we are bad 
eaters. We don’t want them to think that they are bad cooks or insult them so we 
have to swallow our pride and admit to a major fault and nobody likes to admit and
tell people what their faults are. (Joyce, 2015)
The writer contrasts the two kinds of explanation for non-eating: that she and her husband
are 'bad eaters' and that their relatives or friends are 'bad cooks.'
Given  the  nature  of  the  context  under  consideration,  there  are  advantages  and
disadvantages to these two ways of excusing one's non-eating. Consider the first kind of
excuse. It's easy to know whether one finds food displeasing, and (with a few caveats) it's
hard for others to show otherwise.5 So this kind of excuse is easy to provide and hard to
challenge.  However,  in  the  context  under  consideration,  the  fact  that  one  finds  food
displeasing will  not  allow one to  escape the  consequences  of  violating the  rule  about
eating  even what  you find displeasing.  In  that  context,  it  doesn't  matter  whether  one
dislikes the taste of the food: that's not a reason for not eating it. Consider the second kind
of excuse viz. that the food is deviant. Even if the first kind of excuse is not acceptable in
the context, this second kind of excuse can be an acceptable excuse in the context. However,
it's also easier to challenge. If the food is not identifiably other than it should be, then this
kind of excuse will appear unwarranted.
To see this, suppose that one puts forward a negative taste assessment in order to excuse
one's non-eating in a context where one is under an obligation to eat even what one finds
not  pleasing.  In  the  contexts  we're  envisaging,  that  assessment  is  accountable  to  the
following question: “what's wrong with it?” (cf. (Wiggins, 2004, pp. 34–35)). This question
presupposes  that  there  is  something  wrong  with  the  food.  One  can  respond  to  this
question by rejecting the presupposition: “Nothing. I just don't like it.” Then one's excuse
becomes  of  the  first  kind:  one  is  explaining  one's  non-eating  with  what  one  finds
gustatorily displeasing. But if one does this when the rule is that you eat even what you
find  displeasing,  this  excuse  won't  work.  It  won't  ease  the  violation  of  the  rule.
5 It's possible to challenge someone's claim that she does not like something by citing the fact that she ate it
last week: there are coherence constraints on our food preferences which others can use to challenge our
own claims about what we like and dislike (cf. (Barker, 2013)).
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Alternatively,  one  can  accept  the  presupposition  of  the  question.  Then  one  will  be
pursuing the second kind of excuse: one is explaining one's non-eating with the food itself
and not with what one finds gustatorily displeasing. However, in that case, one needs to
provide an answer to the question and an answer to the question will have to identify
something about the food that explains one's non-eating but which does not reduce to the
fact that one finds the food displeasing. Insofar as one cannot do that, there will seem to be
something amiss with the negative taste assessment: one's inability to answer the question
will seem to betray one's negative taste assessment as unwarranted. This is so even though
one knows first hand that one finds the food displeasing.
So we have a kind of context wherein there's an obligation to eat food even if one finds it
displeasing. The fact that one finds the food displeasing is therefore no excuse for not
eating the food. But a second kind of excuse that focuses upon a way in which the food
deviates from how it ought to be is an acceptable excuse for not eating the food. Let's say
that when someone is putting forward a negative taste assessment in these circumstances
as the second kind of excuse (and not the first), she is in the dinner table context. The dinner
table context seems to make trouble for TP. Negative taste assessments are of the form,
“This is not tasty.” They involve application of “not tasty” to food. Suppose the food is not
pleasing to you and you know this first hand. Then, according to TP, you are warranted in
applying “not tasty” to the food and thus in making a negative taste assessment. However,
if  you  make  this  negative  taste  assessment  in  a  context  wherein  you  are  under  an
obligation to eat even what you find  not  pleasing, and if you proffer the negative taste
assessment as the second kind of excuse for not eating the food, then your assessment will
seem unwarranted insofar as you are unable to provide an answer to the question, “what's
wrong with it?” which grants the presupposition of the question. Just like Joyce, the adult
picky eater, if you were to make the negative taste assessment in the dinner table context
when nothing is awry with the food (as distinct from one's disliking it), you'll seem to be
mis-explaining your non-eating. TP therefore predicts that we should find the negative
taste assessment warranted when it does not seem to be.
One might try to defend TP by suggesting that all we see here is an aversion to being rude.
One might say, on MacFarlane's behalf, TP is not meant to describe variations in the use of
“not tasty” that derive from attempts to avoid being rude. So the observations made here
pose no problem for TP, as MacFarlane intends it: once we screen out uses of “not tasty”
that are shaped by a sensitivity to politeness, we'll find no exception to TP. Let's grant that
uses of “not tasty” which are guided by attempts to avoid being rude are irrelevant to the
correctness of TP. Nonetheless, there will still be some instances of the dinner table context
in  which  we  systematically  avoid  negative  taste  assessments,  even  when  we're  not
attempting to avoid being rude. There is a difference between the following two kinds of
predicament. Firstly, you know that there is something deviant about the food—it does
deviate from a relevant norm regarding its state or production—but you hold back from
making negative taste assessments of the food because, even though you know this, you
don't  want  to  be  rude.  Secondly,  you refrain  from making  negative  taste  assessments
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because you know that there is nothing deviant about the food, despite the fact that you
don't like it. You know that if you made the assessment, your assessment could be held to
account with the question “what's wrong with it?” and you know you wouldn't be able to
point to anything besides the fact that you don't find the food pleasing. In these latter
cases,  you are refraining from making a negative taste assessment of the food but not
because of a fear of being rude. It would be more accurate to say that you know you would
be  providing  an  incorrect  explanation  of  your  non-eating.  You would  be  locating  the
reason for your non-eating in the food when really it lies in your quirky food preferences.
Insofar as there is a difference between refraining from making a negative taste assessment
simply because you don't want to be rude and refraining from making a negative taste
assessment because you know you would be providing an incorrect explanation of why
you're not eating the food, the phenomenon exhibited in the dinner table context is not
reducible to attempts at avoiding rudeness.
4 An alternative to TP
The problem with TP is not hard to fix. We can amend TP as follows:
TP'
If you know first-hand how something tastes, call it “tasty” just in case its flavour is 
pleasing to you, and call it “not tasty” just in case its flavour is not pleasing to you 
and you are not in the dinner table context.
TP' requires that you use neither “tasty” nor “not tasty” when you are in the dinner table
context. Note that this does not mean that in such a context you cannot make other kinds
of assessment of the food e.g. “I don't like it.” It's just that, if you do this, you will putting
forward an assessment that doesn't count as an excuse for not eating that is acceptable in
the context. But TP' does allow you to use “tasty” and “not tasty” in accordance with what
tastes are pleasing (or not) to you (when you know this first hand) when you are not in the
dinner table context.
TP' accounts for the fact that in (at least many) contexts besides the dinner table context, a
negative taste assessment can be used in accordance with TP unproblematically. Consider,
for  instance,  the  context  that  takes  up  centre  stage  in  MacFarlane's  discussion  of
“tasty”/”not tasty”: 
You bite into a fresh apple. It is the tart kind that you particularly like, and it is  
perfectly ripe. “Tasty,” you say, without a moment's hesitation. (MacFarlane, 2014, 
p. 1)
Unlike  in  the  dinner  table  context,  in  this  “solitary  mutterer”  context  life  is  relatively
simple: there's no obligation which one is excusing oneself from by making an assessment
of the food. An assessment therefore cannot be an excuse from such an obligation. In such
a context, we do seem to make negative taste assessments of the apple just in case we find
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its taste not pleasing and we know its taste first hand. MacFarlane's mistake isn't that TP is
never right but rather that he over-generalizes from his “solitary mutterer” context.
I  doubt  very  much  that  TP'  is  the  end  of  the  story—but  that's  not  its  point.  The
conversation analyst Harvey Sacks once remarked:
...however rich our imaginations are, if we use hypothetical, or hypothetical-typical 
versions of the world we are constrained by reference to what an audience, an  
audience of professionals, can accept as reasonable. That might not appear to be a 
terrible constraint until we come to look at the kinds of things that actually occur. 
(Sacks, 1984, p. 25)
I offer TP' not because I think it is correct but because it is a fair summary of what takes
place both in the imagined context upon which MacFarlane focuses and in a context that
has been documented in existing sociological fieldwork—fieldwork which has informed
the  content  of  this  paper.  TP'  thus  makes  explicit  the  fact  that  contexts  of  use  for
“tasty”/”not tasty” can provide  varied constraints  on the warranted use of  “tasty”/”not
tasty.” These constraints are not predictable from the imagined contexts of use that may
first  form  in  one's  imagination—Sack's  'hypothetical-typical  versions  of  the  world.'
Moreover, as we will see in section 6, these constraints can be relevant to our semantic and
pragmatic theorizing about the predicate. So, despite its likely incompleteness, TP' makes
salient the importance of treating contexts of use as unknown unless studied and not as
objects so well known that we can rely solely on our imaginations to gather data about
how language is used within them.
5 MacFarlane's reasons for accepting TP
Let's return to MacFarlane's reasons for accepting TP. His first reason for accepting TP is
that it is self evident that TP is true: never mind the context, this is just obviously how we
use “tasty”/”not tasty.” His second reason for accepting TP is that (1)-(3) sound odd and
TP predicts  this.  His third reason for  accepting TP is  that  “tasty”/”not  tasty” serves a
purpose it would not or could not serve if we didn't use it in accordance with TP.
We can now see that the first and third reasons are unfounded. The one context of use that
MacFarlane  seems  to  bear  in  mind  when  thinking  about  the  use  and  purpose  of
assessments made using “tasty”/”not tasty” is the solitary mutterer context. Sure enough,
there the predicate is plausibly used in the way, and serves the purpose, that MacFarlane
outlines. The same cannot be said of other contexts—such as the dinner table context we
have been discussing. So the first and third reasons do not have the contextual generality
MacFarlane supposes them to have.
MacFarlane's second reason for accepting TP was that (1)-(3) sound odd: 
(1) I’m not sure whether espresso is tasty, but I hate how it tastes.
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(2) I’ve never been able to stand the taste of durian. Might it be tasty?
(3) I love orange juice and hate tomato juice. But who knows? Perhaps tomato juice is
tastier.
TP predicts  this oddness—because to say (1)-(3) is  to violate TP. What does TP' imply
about the oddness of these sentences? It makes exactly the same predictions as TP except
when speakers are in the dinner table context. In that context, TP' predicts that speakers
will consider positive taste assessments unwarranted because the speaker dislikes the taste
of  the  food  and  TP'  predicts  that  speakers  will  consider  negative  taste  assessments
unwarranted even though the speaker does not like the taste of the food. None of this
implies that (1)-(3) should not be odd. But, because (unlike TP) TP' does not imply that
speakers in the dinner table context will say that something is not tasty when they do not
like its taste, TP' also does not imply that (1)-(3) are odd. However, it is not hard to find a
subsidiary rule which is compatible with TP' but which does predict the oddness of (1)-(3):
Subsidiary Rule
If you know first-hand that an item tastes bad to you (or that one item tastes worse 
to you than another) and you are in the dinner table context then don't express  
uncertainty about whether the item is tasty (or about whether one item is less tasty 
than the other).
When used in the dinner table context, (1)-(3) violate this rule. But then we can conclude
that the oddness of (1)-(3) is compatible with both TP and TP' and that it can even be
predicted by both—at least, when the latter is supplemented with a suitable subsidiary
rule. So MacFarlane's second reason for accepting TP does not provide us with any reason
to favour TP over TP'.
6 TP and objectivism
Recall from section 1 that MacFarlane (2014, p. 2)  defines objectivism about “tasty”/”not
tasty” as follows:
Objectivism
(a) “tasty” is true of some things, false of others, and
(b) whether “tasty” is true or false of a thing, on a particular occasion of use, does 
not depend on the idiosyncratic tastes of the speaker, assessor, or anyone else.
As  we  noted  earlier,  MacFarlane  rejects  objectivism  because  he  thinks  that  it  has  an
implausible consequence, given two further assumptions: firstly, that for any food, some
speakers find it pleasing and others find it displeasing; and secondly, that TP is the rule
speakers follow in counting applications of “tasty”/”not tasty” as warranted. Given these
two assumptions, for any food, some speakers will judge it tasty and others will judge it
not tasty but one group of speakers will be mistaken. This implies that speakers are using
an evidently unreliable method for forming judgements and claims about what is tasty.
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MacFarlane rejects objectivism because he thinks it is implausible that speakers would use
an evidently unreliable method to form taste judgements and claims.
If, as we have found, TP is not our method for using “tasty”/”not tasty” then what should
we say about objectivism? One thing we cannot say is that objectivism is a live option for
“tasty”/”not tasty” in all contexts. We have already conceded that there are some contexts
—like  the  solitary  mutterer  context—in  which  TP is  a  pretty  good description  of  the
method, in that context, for using “tasty”/”not tasty.” So in such contexts, MacFarlane's
argument  against  objectivism seems  plausible.  If  objectivism were  true,  then  in  those
contexts,  we  would be  using  a  method for  using  “tasty”/”not  tasty”  that  is  evidently
unreliable and perhaps it is unreasonable to suppose that we would use such a method.
Similarly, nothing has been said which suggests that MacFarlane's argument goes wrong
when  applied  to  uses  of  “tasty”—regardless  of  whether  those  uses  appear  inside  or
outside the dinner table context. But what about uses of “not tasty” within the dinner table
context?  In  that  context,  our  use  of  ”not  tasty” is  more  sophisticated than TP.  In  that
context,  we consider negative taste assessments to be warranted only if  the fact  that a
speaker  finds  the  food  displeasing  correlates  with  some respect  in  which  the  food  is
deviant: did dad use Auntie Bessie's instead of the usual Paxo? Gustatory displeasure has
to be an indicator of something beyond itself.
Compare this use of “not tasty” in the dinner table context with the use of “red.” Recall
that “red” is an expression which MacFarlane (ibid,  p.  3) takes to be objective, despite
being context-sensitive. He thinks that although one is warranted in using “tasty”/“not
tasty”  in  accordance  with  one's  idiosyncratic  pleasure  reactions  to  food,  one  is  not
analogously  warranted  in  using  “red”  in  accordance  with  one's  idiosyncratic  visual
reactions to objects. So, if you're colour blind (e.g. you see both red and green as brown),
that doesn't mean that you are warranted in applying “brown” to red and green objects.
But, MacFarlane thinks, you  are warranted in applying “tasty” to foods just in case you
like them and “not tasty” just in case you don't.
The dinner table context is a context in which this contrast between “red” and “not tasty”
breaks down. We plausibly use each expression in accordance with a sense: be it our sense
of taste (whether tastes please us) or our sense of colour (whether a thing visually seems
red to us). But with “red” generally, and with “not tasty” in the dinner table context, we do
this only if  our subjective experience of taste or colour (systematically) corresponds to
certain features of our environment. If it does not then we do not count the use of either
predicate in accordance with the corresponding sense as warranted. Rather, we switch to
more subjective ways of speaking. In the case of “red,” we switch to speaking about how
things look or seem to us e.g. “it seems brown to me.” In the case of “not tasty,” we switch
to speaking about what we like e.g. “I don't like this.” In short,  pace  MacFarlane, in the
dinner table context, the negative form of “tasty” (viz. “not tasty”) is just as objective as
“red.” In the dinner table context, if our own taste preferences aren't tracking deviancy in
the relevant food (whatever deviancy may amount to in the context), then we don't rely on
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our own tastes to guide our use of “not tasty”—just as when, if how things seem visually
to someone doesn't correspond to how they are (as when she is colour blind), then that
someone won't use “red” in accordance with how things visually seem to her. So for uses
of “not tasty” in the dinner table context,  MacFarlane's reason for rejecting objectivism
finds no application. In that context, we do not employ a method for using “not tasty”
which is highly unreliable in getting us to make true judgements and claims, given the
truth  of  objectivism  in  that  context.  So,  as  far  as  MacFarlane's  argument  against
objectivism is concerned, objectivism about “not tasty” is still  an option for the dinner
table context.
I will now close the paper by addressing three prima facie routes out of this conclusion. The
concerns  raised in  the  following discussion will  force the  concession that  only  certain
kinds  of  dinner  table  context  are  a  problem  for  MacFarlane's  argument  against
objectivism.  But,  I  will  argue,  the  concerns  raised  are  not  successful  defences  of  the
argument. The first is as follows. We could identify the use of “not tasty” in the dinner
table  context  with  an  exo-centric  use.  Even  if,  in  such  a  context,  we  don't  follow TP,
perhaps we're using “not tasty” in accordance with what someone else (or some group)
finds displeasing. If so, then, given objectivism, even in the dinner table context, we would
be forming taste judgements and claims using an evidently unreliable method. Does this
possibility  undermine  the  sketched  defence  of  objectivism for  “not  tasty”?  There's  no
denying  that  in  the  dinner  table  context  one  can use  “not  tasty”  exo-centrically.  For
example,  a  deferential  husband  may  use  “not  tasty”  in  accordance  with  his  wife's
gustatory dislikes. Noticing that his wife doesn't like the food he's cooked, and wanting to
be congenial, he meekishly excuses himself from eating it by saying, “this is not tasty,”
whilst using “not tasty” in line with his wife's gustatory dislikes.  If  the question were
raised, “what's wrong with it?” the correct answer would be: my wife doesn't like it. Thus,
despite  this  being  the  dinner  table  context,  “not  tasty,”  is  used  in  accordance  with
someone's gustatory dislikes i.e. in a way that is unreliable given the truth of objectivism.
However, although one can do so, one does not have to use “not tasty” in this way in the
dinner table context. One could also use “not tasty” in a way that is shaped by a sensitivity
to whether the food deviates from some norm, where the norm cannot be identified with
anyone's gustatory dislikes. In that case, the correct answer to the question “what's wrong
with it?” will describe some way in which the food deviates from a norm other than how
some privileged individual or group reacts to the food in question. Insofar as there are
some such uses of “not tasty,” there are some instances of the dinner table context in which
MacFarlane's argument against objectivism finds no application: in those instances, there's
no use of an evidently unreliable method for reaching judgements about what's tasty, even
given objectivism. On the contrary, speakers are exhibiting a careful sensitivity to whether
the  method  described  by  the  original  TP  rule  really  is  tracking  certain  contextually
relevant objective facts about the food: they aim to refrain from making a negative taste
assessment if they suspect their displeasure isn't tracking anything deviant about the food.
So even though, of course, one can use “not tasty” exo-centrically, whilst excusing oneself
from eating food that one finds displeasing and which one is under an obligation to eat,
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that  doesn't  mean  that  the  dinner  table  context  provides  no  trouble  for  MacFarlane's
argument against objectivism.
A second  prima facie route out of this conclusion focuses on the matter of what settles
which norm, in a given context, determines how food ought to be (or normally is). Let's
assume  that  the  norm  is  not  identifiable  with  some  privileged  person's  or  group's
gustatory reactions to the food. Thus, whether or not a food deviates from the norm is not
simply a matter of whether the food is displeasing to some privileged person or group. For
example, it might be that in the context, pastries are deviant if they are soggy and not dry.
Whether a given pastry is soggy and not dry, is  not a matter of whether the pastry is
pleasing to some privileged person or group. However, what factors influence which norm
is in place in a given context? Perhaps which norm is in place in a given context will be
determined in some more or less intimate way by what certain privileged persons find
gustatorily pleasing. For example, although being soggy is not the same as being pleasing to
X, the fact that, in a given context, pastries are deviant if they are soggy, may be strongly
influenced by what some privileged persons find gustatorily pleasing. If so, then isn't the
second kind of excuse that we have been considering—the one that explains non-eating by
appeal to deviancy in the food and not by appeal to someone's gustatory reactions to the
food—just as dependent on the idiosyncratic tastes of a privileged person or persons? If it
is, then MacFarlane's argument against objectivism would apply even to “not tasty” as
used to put forward this second kind of excuse.
I agree that gustatory reactions may (though they need not) play a role in fixing the norm
against which deviancy is measured in a given context,  even if deviancy itself  is not a
matter of deviating from what someone finds pleasing. Again: although in some context,
pastries are supposed to be dry and not soggy, this norm might be in place in the context
because certain privileged persons find soggy pastries gustatorily displeasing. However, if
one attempts to defend MacFarlane's argument against objectivism in this way, then it's
hard  to  see  how a  contrast  can  be  sustained  between  “not  tasty”  and other  gradable
adjectives like “red” or “tall.” Subjective factors which vary between speakers are just as
likely to play a role in settling the contextually relevant standards for being tall or being
red as they are for settling a norm of deviancy for food to which “not tasty” might be
applied: this is so, even if the standards themselves are not simply that something seems
tall to some privileged person or that some object seems red to some privileged person.
For example, in a given context, an apple might have to be red on its surface in order to
qualify as a red apple. Whether an apple is red on its surface is not identifiable with how
the apple seems to any privileged person. However, the fact that that is how an apple has
to be in order to be red, in the context, could be something which is dependent in some
more or less intimate way upon the subjective states of some privileged persons. So if this
is  reason  enough  to  say  that  use  of  “not  tasty”  varies  with  the  idiosyncrasies  of  the
speaker, an assessor or somebody else, then MacFarlane's anti-objectivism argument will
apply to  all gradable adjectives.  I  take this to  be a  reductio of this defence of the anti-
objectivism  argument.  MacFarlane  aims  to  draw  our  attention  to  a  behaviour  of
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“tasty”/”not tasty” which distinguishes it from other gradable adjectives. One can deny (in
the way just described) that the argument against objectivism falters at the use of “not
tasty” which I have described in this paper, only by forfeiting this ambition. The sense in
which “tasty”/”not tasty” is supposed to be subjective, and which distinguishes it from
other gradable adjectives, is that, when using it in accordance with your gustatory likes
and  dislikes,  you  don't  have  to  worry  about  whether  your  subjective  assessments  of
something's being tasty are really detecting anything beyond whether you find the food
gustatorily pleasing. But in this sense of subjective, the use of “not tasty” in the dinner
table context that we have focused upon is not subjective.
Finally, a third  prima facie route out of our conclusion begins with the thought that we
should acknowledge that some answers that one can give in response to the challenge
“what's wrong with it?” are exemplified by the following nuanced assessments: the cheese
clashes with the gravy, or, the coriander is misplaced. One might think that such remarks
can show that the challenged negative taste assessment (qua excuse for not eating the food)
is  warranted.  Yet,  such  remarks  might  reasonably  be  called  “subjective.”  Whether  the
cheese clashes with the gravy is surely a matter of what displeases a privileged X. If so,
then  surely  the  negative  taste  assessment  itself  may reasonably  be  called  “subjective”
because it is being used in accordance with what displeases a privileged X. But if so, then,
it seems, even in the dinner table context, “not tasty” is still being used in accordance with
what displeases a privileged X. So MacFarlane's argument still applies to such uses of “not
tasty”: even in those contexts, speakers are using “not tasty” in a way that, if objectivism
were true, would imply that speakers are using a method to make taste judgements and
claims which is evidently unreliable. Speakers wouldn't do that. So objectivism must be
false in these contexts.
I have already conceded that there are some versions of the dinner table context in which
the standard against which food is assessed is reducible to what displeases a privileged X
(cf.  the congenial  husband).  That concession doesn't  ruin the objection laid out in this
paper because there are other contexts in which the standard used does not reduce to
such.  A similar  response  can  be  given  to  the  current  concern.  Let's  begin  by  sorting
answers to the question “what's wrong with it?” which seem to describe the food, and not
what  displeases  a  privileged  X,  into  two  groups.  There  are  those  that  are  not
distinguishable from claims to the effect that the food is displeasing to a privileged X:
there is no conceptual gap between whether the claim is true and whether the food is
displeasing to X. This would happen if, for example, someone says, “the cheese clashes
with the gravy” but the use made of this sentence is interchangeable with the speaker's use
of “X doesn't like this.” Then again there are those answers that are distinguishable in this
way: there is a conceptual gap between whether the claim is true and whether the food is
displeasing to X. This would happen if, for example, someone says, “the cheese clashes
with the gravy” but the use made of this sentence is not interchangeable with the speaker's
use of “X doesn't like this.”
14
Now,  in  order  for  the  objection  that  I  raise  against  MacFarlane's  argument  against
objectivism to fail for the reason laid out in this third prima facie response, there can be no
context in which only reasons of the second kind—reasons that are not reducible to the
dislikes of X (whoever X may be)—suffice to make a negative taste assessment warranted.
Insofar as there are such contexts, there are uses of “not tasty” which are not guided by
what  is  displeasing  to  a  privileged  X  unless  that  correlates  with  something  else.  The
objection indicates that there might be dinner table contexts in which answers are given to
the question, “what's wrong with it?” which are not explicit statements of the form “X
doesn't like this” but which are nonetheless used in a way that is interchangeable with
such statements and which make a negative taste assessment warranted. However, this
doesn't show that there are no dinner table contexts in which the answers given to “what's
wrong with it?” are of the second kind; and that's all we need in order to make trouble for
MacFarlane. Are there any such contexts? I think there are likely to be two kinds of such
contexts.
Firstly, regardless of whether nuanced assessments are reducible to a matter of whether
the food is displeasing to a privileged X, there are contexts in which nuanced assessments
generally will not make a negative taste assessment (qua excuse for not eating one's food)
warranted. There are some contexts where, if one tried to use a nuanced assessment in this
role then one would come across as drawing spurious distinctions which don't correspond
to anything real in the food: certainly, not real enough to excuse one's non-eating. Just
suppose, for example, that a friend of yours, has cooked a nutritious lunch for you, despite
her relative poverty, and you try to justify not eating it because, “the cheese clashes with
the gravy.” It does not seem to me that such a nuanced assessment will show the negative
taste assessment to be warranted in this context: neither you, nor your friend, would think
that this suffices, in the context, to make the negative taste assessment warranted. Even if
the the cheese clashes with the gravy, provided the food meets some other more down-to-
earth  standards,  this  won't  show  that  your  negative  taste  assessment  is  warranted—
regardless of whether nuanced assessments are reducible to a matter of whether the food
is displeasing to a privileged X. In this kind of context, only non-nuanced assessments can
be given in response to the challenge “what's  wrong with it?”  and stand a chance of
making the challenged negative taste assessment warranted. Insofar as the non-nuanced
assessments  draw  attention  to  uncontroversially  objective  features  of  the  food  or  its
production, the responses will not be reducible to whether the food is displeasing to a
privileged X.
Secondly, it's not at all obvious that nuanced assessments themselves inevitably reduce to
assessments of whether the food is displeasing to some privileged X: i.e. that inevitably
there is no conceptual gap between whether the food is displeasing to X and whether there
is, for example, a clash between the cheese and the gravy. This thesis needs an argument.
MacFarlane provides none and, as far as I am aware, neither does anyone else. Insofar as
there are some contexts in which there's no such reduction, even if nuanced assessments do
show  a  negative  taste  assessment  (qua  excuse  for  not  eating)  to  be  warranted,  those
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contexts will be just as problematic for MacFarlane's argument against objectivism as the
contexts just considered i.e. those in which nuanced assessments fail to show a negative
taste assessment (qua excuse for not eating) to be warranted.
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